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Abstract
We study the interplay of probabilistic sophistication, second order stochastic dominance, and
uncertainty aversion, three fundamental notions in choice under uncertainty. In particular, our
main result, Theorem 2, characterizes uncertainty averse preferences that satisfy second order
stochastic dominance, as well as uncertainty averse preferences that are probabilistically sophis-
ticated.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study in depth the overlap between the two fundamental classes of probabilisti-
cally sophisticated preferences and uncertainty averse preferences. The former class of preferences,
introduced and axiomatized by Machina and Schmeidler [15], rank acts f : S ! X according to




where q is a reference probability measure, q ￿ f￿1 is the lottery induced on X by f under q, and M
is a functional over the set of lotteries on X. Probabilistically sophisticated preferences characterize
decision makers that are able to quantify their beliefs with a single probability measure q, but that
on the induced lotteries q ￿ f￿1 do not necessarily satisfy the expected utility axioms.1
Uncertainty averse preferences are complete and transitive preferences that are both monotone and
convex. It is a very large class of preferences, arguably the most basic class of rational preferences that
exhibit a negative attitude toward uncertainty. Recently, in Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci,
￿We thank Peter Klibano⁄ and Tomasz Strzalecki for some useful comments. The ￿nancial support of the European
Research Council (advanced grant, BRSCDP-TEA) is gratefully acknowledged.
1Papers that study the properties of probabilistically sophisticated preferences include Grant [11], Machina and
Schmeidler [16], Sarin and Wakker [20], Grant and Polak [12], Chew and Sagi [5] and [6], and Kopylov [13].
1and Montrucchio [2] we establish a representation for uncertainty averse preferences that plays a key
role in our analysis. Speci￿cally, we show that these preferences rank acts according to







where G : R ￿ ￿ ! (￿1;1] is a quasiconvex function that is increasing in the ￿rst component, and
u : X ! R is an a¢ ne function. The function G is an index of uncertainty aversion, while u captures
risk aversion.
In view of the representation (2), to study the overlap between probabilistically sophisticated and
uncertainty averse preferences amounts to determine what properties of the index G characterize
uncertainty averse preferences that are probabilistically sophisticated. Our main result, Theorem 2,
achieves this goal by showing, under a standard assumption of nonatomicity, that a suitable symme-
try property of G, called rearrangement invariance, characterizes the uncertainty averse preferences
that are probabilistically sophisticated. In this way, we considerably extend earlier results of Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini [18] for variational preferences, a special class of uncertainty averse
preferences.
Theorem 2 also establishes some remarkable properties of uncertainty averse preferences that satisfy
second order stochastic dominance, a property widely used in economic applications. As discussed
after its statement, in a sense Theorem 2 can be viewed as, ￿rst of all, a result on the overlap between
uncertainty aversion and second order stochastic dominance.
As a byproduct of Theorem 2, in Proposition 3 we show that in the presence of a nontrivial
unambiguous event the overlap collapses to the class of subjective expected utility preferences. This
shows that the basic tension ￿rst identi￿ed by Marinacci [17] among probabilistic sophistication and
the multiple priors representation (recently extended by Strzalecki [23] to variational preferences)
extends much more generally to the uncertainty averse case. Moreover, Proposition 3 shows that this
tension is actually peculiar to second order stochastic dominance, which turns out to be the general
property with a problematic interplay with uncertainty aversion.
Mathematically, our results build on the theory of rearrangement invariant Banach spaces, ￿rst
studied in the seminal paper of Luxemburg [14]. More precisely, Theorem 2 depends on a dual charac-
terization of quasiconcave and rearrangement invariant functionals de￿ned over the normed space of
simple functions. This characterization shares some of the techniques of Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Montrucchio [4], where quasiconvex and rearrangement invariant functionals de￿ned
over L1 (S;￿;q) are studied and characterized. However, the present very di⁄erent decision theoretic




We consider an Anscombe-Aumann setup [1]. Let S be a state space endowed with an event ￿-algebra
￿, and X a convex set of consequences. We denote by F the set of all simple acts f : S ! X, that
is, the set of all ￿-measurable maps that take on ￿nitely many values. Given A 2 ￿ and f;g 2 F, we
denote by gAf the simple act that yields g (s) if s 2 A and f(s) if s 62 A.
2Let B0 = B0 (S;￿) be the set of simple ￿-measurable functions, ’ : S ! R, endowed with the
supnorm. Denote by ￿ the set of all ￿nitely additive probabilities on ￿, endowed with the weak*
topology. The subset of ￿ consisting of all countably additive probabilities on ￿ is denoted by ￿￿ .
Given q 2 ￿￿, denote by ￿￿ (q) = fp 2 ￿ : p ￿ qg the set of all countably additive probabilities on
￿ that are absolutely continuous with respect to (wrt, for short) q. Finally, when q 2 ￿￿, we say that
(S;￿;q) is adequate if either q is nonatomic or if S is ￿nite and q is uniform.
Endow R￿￿ with the product topology and de￿ne L(R￿￿) as the class of functions G : R￿￿ !
(￿1;1] such that:
(i) G(￿;p) is an increasing function for all p 2 ￿;
(ii) G is quasiconvex and lower semicontinuous;
(iii) minp2￿ G(t;p) = t for all t 2 R.
A function G 2 L(R ￿ ￿) is linearly continuous if the function I : B0 ! R de￿ned by







is continuous. For example, [2] shows that G 2 L(R￿￿) is linearly continuous if G(￿;p) is upper
semicontinuous on R for each p 2 ￿.
2.2 Decision Theoretic Setup
We consider a binary relation % on F that satis￿es the following classic axioms:
A 1 (Weak Order) The binary relation % is nontrivial, complete, and transitive.
A 2 (Monotonicity) If f;g 2 F and f(s) % g(s) for all s 2 S, then f % g.
A 3 (Uncertainty Aversion) If f;g 2 F and ￿ 2 (0;1), f ￿ g implies ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % f.
Following [2], a preference relation % that satis￿es axioms A1-A3 is called uncertainty averse. As
[2] argues at length, this is the most basic class of rational preferences on F that exhibit a negative
attitude toward uncertainty.
To derive a representation for uncertainty averse preferences we need some further mild axioms.
The following axiom is peculiar to the Anscombe-Aumann setting and is a standard independence
axiom on constant acts, that is, on acts that only involve risk and no state uncertainty.
A 4 (Risk Independence) If x;y;z 2 X and ￿ 2 (0;1), x ￿ y implies ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)z ￿ ￿y +
(1 ￿ ￿)z.
The next axioms are technical conditions that simplify the derivation and make the representation
more tractable.
A 5 (Continuity) If f;g;h 2 F, the sets f￿ 2 [0;1] : ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % hg and f￿ 2 [0;1] : h %
￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)gg are closed.
3A 6 (Unboundedness) There are x;y 2 X such that, for each ￿ 2 (0;1), there exist z;z0 2 X such
that ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)y ￿ x ￿ y ￿ ￿z0 + (1 ￿ ￿)x.
A 7 (Monotone Continuity) If f;g 2 F, x 2 X, fEngn 2 ￿ with En # ;, then f ￿ g implies that
there exists n0 2 N such that xEn0f ￿ g.
If % satis￿es axioms A1, A2, and A5, then each act f 2 F has a certainty equivalent xf 2 X;
i.e., f ￿ xf. Certainty equivalents play an important role in the following representation result for
uncertainty averse preferences, proved in [2]. Here U (X) is the class of a¢ ne functions u : X ! R.
Theorem 1 Let % be a binary relation on F. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % satis￿es axioms A1-A7;
(ii) there exist u 2 U (X), with u(X) = R, and G 2 L(R￿￿) linearly continuous with domG ￿
R￿￿￿,2 such that, for each f and g in F,






















Observe that the technical axioms A5-A7 translate in the representation as follows: A5 guarantees
the linear continuity of G, A6 corresponds to u(X) = R, and A7 implies that domG ￿ R￿￿￿.3
Theorem 1 motivates the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 1 A pair (u;G) 2 U (X) ￿ L(R ￿ ￿) that represents a binary relation % in the sense of
point (ii) of Theorem 1 is called an uncertainty averse representation of %.4
Behaviorally, by Theorem 1 a binary relation admits an uncertainty averse representation if and
only if it satis￿es axioms A1-A7. As shown in [2, Proposition 12], the variational preferences of [18]
correspond to the additively separable case
G(t;p) = t + c(p) (6)
where c : ￿ ! [0;1] is a lower semicontinuous convex function.
The function G is an index of uncertainty aversion. Given two preferences %1 and %2, based on
Ghirardato and Marinacci [8] say that %1 is more uncertainty averse than %2 if, for each f 2 F and
each x 2 X,
f %1 x =) f %2 x: (7)
In [2, Proposition 6] we prove that, if %1 and %2 have uncertainty averse representations (u1;G1) and
(u2;G2), the following conditions are equivalent:
2Recall that domG = f(t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿ : G(t;p) < 1g.
3[2, Theorem 3] provides a more general representation result that does not rely on A6 and A7.
4Though to ease terminology we use the term uncertainty averse representation, to be precise we should have used
the term surjective and monotone continuous, uncertainty averse representation.
4(i) %1 is more uncertainty averse than %2,
(ii) u1 is cardinally equivalent to u2 and, normalizing u1 = u2, G1 ￿ G2.
We close with a representation result that shows what the classic axioms of Savage [21] imply
in the present Anscombe-Aumann setting. It is an essentially known result, studied for example by
Neilson [19] and, more recently, by Strzalecki [22]. For completeness, in the Appendix we report a
proof of this result since it will play an important role in what follows and we did not ￿nd a proof of
the version that we use.
Proposition 1 Let % be a binary relation on F. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % satis￿es Savage￿ s axioms P1-P6 and axioms A4-A5;
(ii) there exist a nonatomic probability measure q, a nonconstant a¢ ne u : X ! R, and a strictly
increasing and continuous function ￿ : u(X) ! R such that, for each f and g in F,





The probability q is unique, u is cardinally unique, and ￿ is cardinally unique given u.5 Moreover, ￿
is concave if and only if % satis￿es A3, and q 2 ￿￿ if and only if % satis￿es A7.
In other words,
R
￿(u(f))dq represents a preference % of a Savage decision maker in an Ascombe-
Aumann world.
3 Main Result
In this section we state the paper￿ s main result, Theorem 2, which characterizes uncertainty averse
preferences that are probabilistically sophisticated.
Fix a reference probability q 2 ￿￿. In [18, Theorem 14] it is shown that variational preferences are
probabilistically sophisticated wrt q if and only if the uncertainty aversion index c in (6) is rearrange-
ment invariant wrt q, provided (S;￿;q) is adequate.6 Hence, probabilistic sophistication translates
into a property of symmetry of the index c when preferences are variational. Here, Theorem 2 shows
that this property can be suitably generalized to all uncertainty averse preferences.
To state the main result we introduce few classic notions, key for our analysis. A preference relation
% on F:
(i) is probabilistically sophisticated (wrt q) if, given any f;g 2 F,
q (fs 2 S : f (s) = xg) = q (fs 2 S : g (s) = xg) 8x 2 X =) f ￿ g; (9)
(ii) satis￿es ￿rst order stochastic dominance (wrt q) if, given any f;g 2 F,




￿(u(g))dq 8￿ 2 ￿mi =) f % g; (11)
5See (21) in Appendix and its discussion for more details on uniqueness.
6Rearrangement invariance is a symmetry property that will be introduced shortly.
5where ￿mi is the set of all increasing functions ￿ : R ! R;7




￿(u(g))dq 8￿ 2 ￿icv =) f % g; (12)
where ￿icv is the set of all concave and increasing functions ￿ : R ! R.8
To interpret the latter dominance conditions, consider decision makers that rank acts in F ac-
cording to the representation (8). A preference % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance when
it preserves the unanimous preference of all these decision makers that are uncertainty averse (i.e.,
that feature a concave ￿) and share the same u over the constant acts X. Analogously, % satis￿es
￿rst order stochastic dominance when it preserves the unanimous preference of all monotone decision
makers (i.e., that feature an increasing ￿) and share the same u over X.
These dominance notions can be also easily interpreted in terms of the classic notions of stochastic
dominance on lotteries. In fact, (11) is equivalent to require that the lottery induced by u￿f under q
￿rst order stochastically dominates that induced by u ￿ g, while (12) is equivalent to require that the
former lottery second order stochastically dominates the latter one.
Our results use the convex order, a classic stochastic order. Speci￿cally, the convex order %cx on
L1 (q) = L1 (S;￿;q) is de￿ned by




‘( )dq 8‘ 2 ￿cx; (13)
where ￿cx is the set of all convex functions ￿ : R ! R. Notice that this order can be also de￿ned over
￿￿ (q) by







where dp=dq and dp0=dq in L1 (q) are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of p and p0, respectively. In this
case, the symmetric part of %cx coincides with the identical distribution of the densities wrt q. For
example, if S is ￿nite and q the uniform, then p ￿cx p0 if and only if there is a permutation ￿ : S ! S
such that p0 = p ￿ ￿.
A function T : ￿ ! (￿1;1], with domT ￿ ￿￿ (q), is
(i) rearrangement invariant (wrt q) if p ￿cx p0 =) T (p) = T (p0);
(ii) Schur convex (wrt q) if p %cx p0 =) T (p) ￿ T (p0).
We are ready to state our main result. A ￿nal piece of notation: given ’ 2 L1 (q), its inverse distrib-
ution function F￿1
’ : [0;1] ! [￿1;1] is de￿ned by F￿1
’ (!) = inf fx 2 R : q (fs 2 S : ’(s) ￿ xg) ￿ !g
for all ! 2 [0;1].
Theorem 2 Let % be a binary relation with uncertainty averse representation (u;G). Then, the
following conditions are equivalent (wrt q):
(i) % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance;
(ii) G(t;￿) is Schur convex on ￿ for all t 2 R.
7In (11) and (12) we assume that % restricted to X is represented by the a¢ ne utility function u.
8Clearly, ￿icv ￿ ￿mi, and so second order stochatistic dominance obviously implies the ￿rst one. Moreover, it can





































(1 ￿ !)d! < t
￿
if (t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿￿ (q)
1 else.
(15)
Moreover, if (S;￿;q) is adequate, then (i) and (ii) are equivalent to:
(iii) % satis￿es ￿rst order stochastic dominance;
(iv) % is probabilistically sophisticated;
(v) G(t;￿) is rearrangement invariant on ￿ for all t 2 R.
Theorem 2 is a powerful result that establishes few nontrivial properties. To ￿x ideas, consider
the important case where (S;￿;q) is adequate. First, Theorem 2 shows that in this case probabilistic
sophistication remarkably turns out to be equivalent to ￿rst and to second order stochastic domi-
nance, something that in general does not hold. Second, Theorem 2 shows that Schur convexity and
rearrangement invariance are the functional properties of the index G that characterize a probabilis-
tically sophisticated and uncertainty averse preference. Finally, (14) and (15) show what form the
index G takes for this class of preferences.
Taken together, all these features of Theorem 2 establish for the adequate case a complete char-
acterization of uncertainty averse preferences that are probabilistically sophisticated. In particular,
the equivalence between (iv) and (v), that is, between probabilistic sophistication and rearrangement
invariance, extends to the present much more general setting the characterization of probabilistic
sophistication via a symmetry property of the index c in (6) that [18] established for variational
preferences.
Observe that the ￿rst part of the theorem fully characterizes second order stochastic dominance
even in the nonadequate case. Since in the adequate case second order stochastic dominance is
equivalent to probabilistic sophistication, in a sense Theorem 2 can be more properly viewed as a
characterization of uncertainty averse preferences that satisfy second order stochastic dominance, a
very important property in economic applications.
We close with a corollary of our main result. Denote by %u;q the Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU) preference represented by
R
u(f)dq.
Corollary 1 Let % be a binary relation with uncertainty averse representation (u;G). Then, % is
more uncertainty averse than %u;q provided at least one of the following conditions holds (wrt q):
(i) % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance;
(ii) % is probabilistically sophisticated and (S;￿;q) is adequate.
That is, according to the terminology of [8], each of the conditions (i) and (ii) guarantees that %
is an absolute uncertainty averse preference.
74 Unambiguous Events
Marinacci [17] pointed out a possible tension between probabilistic sophistication, which is based on
a single reference probability, and the multiple priors representation, which instead relies on several
possible probabilities. Thank to Theorem 2, in this section we show that this possible tension holds,
much more generally, among probabilistic sophistication and uncertainty averse representations.
In order to do so, we ￿rst extend to our setting the notion of nontrivial unambiguous event of [17].
Consider a multiple priors representation a la Gilboa and Schmeidler [10]
V (f) = min
p2C
Z
u(f)dp 8f 2 F; (16)
where C is a weak* closed set of ￿. An event is nontrivial and unambiguous if and only if 0 < p(A) =
p0 (A) < 1 for all p;p0 2 C. To generalize this notion to the present setting, consider the revealed
unambiguous preference of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci [9], de￿ned as
f %￿ g () ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)h % ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)h 8h 2 F;8￿ 2 (0;1]: (17)
In [2, Theorem 10] we show that for preferences with an uncertainty averse representation it holds




u(g)dp 8p 2 dom￿ G; (18)
where dom￿ G = fp 2 ￿ : G(t;p) < 1 for some t 2 Rg. This motivates the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 Let % be an uncertainty averse preference. An event A in ￿ is nontrivial and unam-
biguous if there exist x;y;z 2 X such that x ￿ z ￿ y and xAy ￿￿ z.
In other words, an event A is unambiguous if the act xAy is ￿unambiguosly￿ indi⁄erent to a
constant act z. Clearly, constant acts are unambiguous since their outcomes are independent of the
underlying state space realizations. Moreover, the condition x ￿ z ￿ y rules out the possibility that
A is ￿unambiguous￿because either A or its complement are deemed null wrt %.
Proposition 2 Let % be a binary relation with uncertainty averse representation (u;G). Then, the
following properties are equivalent:
(i) A is unambiguous;
(ii) for each x;y 2 X such that x ￿ y there exists z 2 X such that x ￿ z ￿ y and xAy ￿￿ z;
(iii) 0 < p(A) = p0 (A) < 1 for all p;p0 2 dom￿ G.
Remark Strazlecki [23] implicitly provides di⁄erent notions of unambiguous event for unbounded
variational preferences. By (18) and Proposition 2-(iii), it follows that our notion of unambiguous
event gives a behavioral foundation and a generalization of the notion contained in his Assumption
2N.
We now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 Let % be a binary relation with uncertainty averse representation (u;G). If there
exists a nontrivial unambiguous event, then (wrt q):
(i) % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance if and only if % is the SEU preference %u;q.
8(ii) % is probabilistically sophisticated if and only if % is the SEU preference %u;q, provided (S;￿;q)
is adequate.
Point (ii) generalizes the main result of [17] to the present general setting. Point (i) shows that,
even when (S;￿;q) is not adequate, second order stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion can
be both satis￿ed only by SEU preference as soon as there exists at least one nontrivial unambiguous
event.
By Theorem 2, probabilistic sophistication and second order stochastic dominance are equivalent
properties in the adequate case. Point (i) thus shows that the tension originally identi￿ed by [17]
among probabilistic sophistication and multiple priors holds much more generally among second order
stochastic dominance and uncertainty aversion. Since second order stochastic dominance is a widely
used property in applications, this is an important novel insight of Proposition 3. Along with its
substantially greater generality, this insight is what makes Proposition 3 a signi￿cant advance relative
to the analysis of [17].
A Proofs and Related Analysis
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) implies (ii). By Savage￿ s Expected Utility Theorem,9 there are a nonconstant v : X ! R and a
nonatomic probability q on ￿ such that V : F ! R given by V (f) =
R
v (f)dq represents %. In
particular, % satis￿es A1 and A2, which together with A4 and A5, guarantee that:
￿ There exists a nonconstant a¢ ne function u : X ! R and a function I : B0 (u(X)) ! R
normalized, monotone, and continuous such that f % g () I (u(f)) ￿ I (u(g)). Moreover, u is
cardinally unique, and, given u, there is a unique normalized I : B0 (u(X)) ! R that represents
% in the above sense (see [2, Lemma 60]).
￿ For each f 2 F there exists xf 2 X such that f ￿ xf.
Since u is a¢ ne, u(X) = K is an interval. Since both u and v represent % on X, there exists a
strictly increasing ￿ : u(X) ! R such that v = ￿ ￿ u. It only remains to show that ￿ is continuous.




￿(u(f))dq = V (f) = v (xf) = ￿(u(xf));
and so
R
￿( )dq 2 Im￿.10 Now, for each t1 = ￿(k1);t2 = ￿(k2) 2 Im￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1), take A 2 ￿
such that q (A) = ￿ (this is possible since q is nonatomic). Then
￿t1 + (1 ￿ ￿)t2 = ￿￿(k1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(k2) =
Z
￿(k11A + k21Ac)dq 2 Im￿:
Therefore, Im￿ is convex and ￿ is continuous (￿ is increasing).





hold. Moreover, A4 follows from the fact that V : X ! R given by V (x) = ￿(u(x)) represents % on
X, with ￿ is strictly increasing and u a¢ ne.
9Notice that we are assuming that ￿ is a ￿-algebra (see, e.g., Wakker [24, Observation 2]).













= I (u(f)) = I ( ).
9It remains to show that   7!
R
￿( )dq is continuous on B0 (K), which in turn implies A5. Let
 n be a sequence in B0 (K) that supnorm converges to   2 B0 (K). For each ￿ > 0, eventually
j n (s) ￿   (s)j ￿ ￿ 8s 2 S. (19)
Moreover,  n is supnorm bounded and so it is easy to check that there are a;b 2 R such that [a;b] ￿ K
and, eventually,  n;  2 B0 ([a;b]) for all n ￿ 1. But, being continuous, ￿ is also uniformly continuous
on [a;b]. Thus, for all " > 0 there is ￿" > 0 such that
t;r 2 [a;b] and jt ￿ rj ￿ ￿" =) j￿(t) ￿ ￿(r)j ￿ "
Then, eventually j n (s) ￿   (s)j ￿ ￿" for all s 2 S, and j￿( n (s)) ￿ ￿(  (s))j ￿ " for all s 2 S.




￿( )dq, as wanted. Let f;g;h 2 F, and
f￿ng 2 [0;1] be such that ￿nf + (1 ￿ ￿n)g % h for all n ￿ 1, and assume ￿n ! ￿. Then
Z
￿(u(￿nf + (1 ￿ ￿n)g))dq = V (￿nf + (1 ￿ ￿n)g) ￿ V (h) 8n ￿ 1: (20)
But, u(￿nf + (1 ￿ ￿n)g) = ￿nu(f)+(1 ￿ ￿n)u(g) = u(g)+￿n (u(f) ￿ u(g)) ! u(￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g)
in the supnorm. Thus, passing to the limits in (20),
V (￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g) =
Z
￿(u(￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g))dq ￿ V (h);
which immediately delivers A5.
As to uniqueness, we show that
￿
￿ q; ￿ u; ￿ ￿
￿
represents % in the sense of (8) if and only if ￿ q = q and




and ￿ ￿(t) = ￿(￿(￿t + ￿)) + ￿. (21)
By Savage￿ s Expected Utility Theorem, ￿ q = q and there are ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 R such that ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ u =
￿(￿ ￿ u) + ￿. By the von Neumann-Morgenstern￿ s Expected Utility Theorem, there are ￿ > 0 and
￿ 2 R such that ￿ u = ￿￿1 (u ￿ ￿). Therefore, ￿ ￿(￿ u(x)) = ￿(￿(u(x))) + ￿ = ￿(￿(￿￿ u(x) + ￿)) + ￿ for
all x 2 X, and ￿ ￿(t) = ￿(￿(￿t + ￿)) + ￿ for all t 2 ￿ u(X). The converse is easily checked.
Next we show that A3 implies concavity of ￿ and A7 implies q 2 ￿￿, the converse implications
being trivial. Assume per contra that A3 holds and that ￿ is not concave. Since ￿ is continuous, there




< 2￿1￿(t) + 2￿1￿(r). Let H 2 ￿ be such that q (H) = 2￿1,


















￿(r) = V (yHx)







































Suppose A7 holds and let ￿ 3 En & ;. Choose z ￿ y and consider the sequence zm =
￿
1 ￿ m￿1￿
z + m￿1y for all m ￿ 1. We have u(zm) = u(z) ￿ 1
m (u(z) ￿ u(y)) < u(z). For all
m ￿ 1, z ￿ zm and there is nm ￿ 1 such that yEnmz ￿ zm, i.e.,
q (Enm)￿(u(y)) + (1 ￿ q (Enm))￿(u(z)) > ￿(u(zm)): (22)
Wlog set ￿(u(y)) = 0 = 1 ￿ ￿(u(z)). Thus, wn = ￿(u(zm)) ! 1. By (22), for all m ￿ 1 there is
nm ￿ 1 such that 1 ￿ q (Enm) > wm, i.e., q (Enm) < 1 ￿ wm. But, q (Ek) is a decreasing sequence,
therefore 0 ￿ limk q (Ek) ￿ q (Enm) < 1 ￿ wm for all m ￿ 1. Thus, limk q (Ek) = 0 and q 2 ￿￿. ￿
10A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
In this appendix we prove the main result of Section 3. Let (u;G) 2 U (X) ￿ L(R ￿ ￿) be an
uncertainty averse representation of a preference % in the sense of De￿nition 1 and set






8’ 2 B0: (23)
By [2, Theorem 53] there exists at least one q 2 ￿￿ such that domG ￿ R￿￿￿ (q), and hence














8(t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿:
In the study of rearrangement invariance it is useful to consider some important stochastic orders.
We already introduced in (13) the convex order %cx on L1 (q). The increasing convex order %icx, the
￿rst order stochastic dominance (fsd), and the second order stochastic dominance (ssd) are de￿ned
analogously by replacing the set of convex functions ￿cx with that of increasing convex functions
￿icx, increasing functions ￿mi, and increasing concave functions ￿icv. Notice that ’ %icx   if and
only if ￿’ -ssd ￿ , and that the preorders %cx, %icx, %fsd, and %ssd all share the same symmetric
part ￿d, which is the identical distribution relation wrt q.11
A function J de￿ned on a subset of L1 (q) with values in (￿1;1] is:
1. rearrangement invariant if ’ ￿d   =) J (’) = J ( );
2. Schur convex if ’ %cx   =) J (’) ￿ J ( )
Moreover, J preserves ￿rst (resp., second) order stochastic dominance if ’ %fsd   (resp., ’ %ssd  )
implies J (’) ￿ J ( ).
Theorem 3 Let I be the function de￿ned by (23) and q 2 ￿￿ be such that domG ￿ R￿￿￿ (q). The
following conditions are equivalent (wrt q):
(i) I preserves second order stochastic dominance on B0;
(ii) G(t;￿) is Shur convex on ￿ for all t 2 R.
In this case,




























(1 ￿ !)d! < t
￿
if (t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿￿ (q)
1 else.
(25)
Moreover, if (S;￿;q) is adequate, then (i) and (ii) are equivalent to:
(iii) I preserves ￿rst order stochastic dominance on B0;
11See Chong (1974) for this fact and for alternative characterizations of some of these stochastic orders.
11(iv) I is rearrangement invariant on B0;
(v) G(t;￿) is rearrangement invariant on ￿ for all t 2 R.
For all ’ 2 L1 (q) and all ! 2 [0;1], set
￿’ (!) = inf fx 2 R : q (fs 2 S : ’(s) > xg) ￿ !g
￿
= inf fx 2 R : F’ (x) ￿ 1 ￿ !g = F￿1
’ (1 ￿ !)
￿
:
Proof. The proof relies on the theory of rearrangement invariant Banach spaces developed by Lux-
emburg [14] and Chong and Rice [7].
Step 1. If   2 B0 and p 2 ￿￿ (q), then
￿Z





￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (1 ￿ !)d!;
Z 1
0




Moreover, if (S;￿;q) is adequate, then
Z 1
0
￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (1 ￿ !)d! = min
￿Z





￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (!)d! = max
￿Z
 dp0 : ￿￿ (q) 3 p0 ￿d p
￿
: (28)
Proof. [7, 10.2, 13.4, and 13.8] guarantee that, if ’;  2 L1 (q) and ￿j j￿j’j 2 L1 ([0;1];B;￿) = L1 (￿),
then ￿Z





￿  (!)￿’ (1 ￿ !)d!;
Z 1
0
￿  (!)￿’ (!)d!
￿
: (29)
Moreover, if (S;￿;q) is adequate, then
Z 1
0
￿  (!)￿’ (1 ￿ !)d! = min
￿Z





￿  (!)￿’ (!)d! = max
￿Z
 ’0dq : L1 (q) 3 ’0 ￿d ’
￿
. (31)
Notice that, the condition ￿j j￿j’j 2 L1 (￿) is implied by ￿j j 2 L1 (￿) and ￿j’j 2 L1 (￿), which is
implied by   2 B0 and ’ 2 L1 (q) [7, 4.3].




’dq = 1, i.e., ’0 is a probability density.
Finally, if   2 B0 and p 2 ￿￿ (q), then
￿Z

















￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (1 ￿ !)d!;
Z 1
0




Moreover, if (S;￿;q) is adequate, then
Z 1
0
￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (1 ￿ !)d! = min
￿Z

















￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (!)d! = max
￿Z












 dp0 : ￿￿ (q) 3 p0 ￿d p
￿
as wanted. ￿
The next step is essentially due to Hardy.
Step 2. Let r = 1 and ￿ r = 1 or viceversa, ’;’0 2 Lr (q) and   2 L￿ r (q).
(a) ’ -cx ’0 implies
R 1
0 ￿’ (!)￿  (!)d! ￿
R 1
0 ￿’0 (!)￿  (!)d!.
(b) ’ -cx ’0 implies
R 1
0 ￿’ (!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d! ￿
R 1
0 ￿’0 (!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d!.
(c) ’ -icx ’0 and   ￿ 0 (q-a.e.) implies
R 1
0 ￿’ (!)￿  (!)d! ￿
R 1
0 ￿’0 (!)￿  (!)d!.
Proof. See [7, 9.1] ￿
Step 3. If either G(t;￿) is Shur convex on ￿ for all t 2 R, or (S;￿;q) is adequate and G(t;￿) is
rearrangement invariant on ￿ for all t 2 R, then






dq (1 ￿ !)d!;p
￿
8’ 2 B0: (32)




0 ￿’ (!)￿ dp
dq (1 ￿ !)d! for all p 2 ￿￿ (q). Thus,
monotonicity of G in the ￿rst component implies












dq (1 ￿ !)d!;p
￿
:































dq (1 ￿ !)d!;p
￿
￿ I (’)
and the in￿mum is attained. ￿
Step 4. (ii) implies (i) and (24), also (v) implies (i) and (24) provided (S;￿;q) is adequate.
Proof. By Step 3, (ii) guarantees that (32) holds and the same is true for (v) if (S;￿;q) is adequate.




dq (1 ￿ !)d! =
Z 1
0










13which plugged in (32) delivers (24).
Moreover, ’ %ssd   if and only if ￿’ -icx ￿ . Thus, Step 2.c implies
R 1
0 ￿￿’ (!)￿dp=dq (!)d! ￿
R 1
0 ￿￿  (!)￿dp=dq (!)d! for all p 2 ￿￿ (q), but ￿￿’ (!) = ￿￿’ (1 ￿ !) (￿-a.e.) [7, 4.4] and the same
is true for  . This implies that
R 1
0 ￿￿’ (1 ￿ !)￿dp=dq (!)d! ￿
R 1
0 ￿￿  (1 ￿ !)￿dp=dq (!)d! and hence
R 1
0 ￿’ (!)￿dp=dq (1 ￿ !)d! ￿
R 1
0 ￿  (!)￿dp=dq (1 ￿ !)d! for all p 2 ￿￿ (q). By (32), monotonicity of G
allows to conclude that













￿  (!)￿ dp
dq (1 ￿ !)d!;p
￿
= I ( ):
Therefore, I preserves second order stochastic dominance and, in particular, it is rearrangement
invariant. ￿
Step 5. If ’ 2 L1 (q) then there exists f’ng ￿ B0 such that ’n is the conditional expectation of ’
on a ￿nite ￿-algebra for all n 2 N and ’n
k￿k1 ! ’. In particular, ’ %cx ’n for all n 2 N.
Proof. Let ’ 2 L1 (q) and wlog take a bounded version of ’. There exists f ng ￿ B0 that uniformly
converges to ’. Set, for each n 2 N, dn = k’ ￿  nk,  o
n =  n ￿ dn,  0
n =  n + dn, ￿n = ￿ ( n) =
￿ ( o
n) = ￿ ( 0
n). It is immediate to see that  o
n ￿ ’ ￿  0
n for all n 2 N. Moreover, both f o
ng and
f 0
ng converge uniformly to ’, and, for each n 2 N, there exist suitable versions of E( o
nj￿n), E(’j￿n),
and E( 0
nj￿n) such that  n = E( o
nj￿n) ￿ E(’j￿n) ￿ E( 0
nj￿n) =  0
n. De￿ne ’n = E(’j￿n) for
all n 2 N. Clearly, ’n 2 B0 and it uniformly converges to ’.
Finally, observe that for all convex functions ‘ : R ! R, by Jensen￿ s inequality, we have that q-a.e.
‘(’n) = ‘(E(’j￿n)) ￿ E(‘(’)j￿n) 8n 2 N:
Then, by integrating both sides, for all convex ‘ : R ! R
E(‘(’n)) ￿ E(E(‘(’)j￿n)) = E(‘(’)) 8n 2 N:
￿
Step 6. Let   2 B0 and p 2 ￿￿ (q). Then,














dq (!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d!: (34)
Moreover, if (S;￿;q) is adequate then
min
￿Z










dq (!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d!: (35)
Proof. It is easy to verify that f’ 2 L1 (q) : ’ -cx  g is closed wrt k￿k1. Therefore,
clL1(q) (f’ 2 B0 : ’ -cx  g) ￿ f’ 2 L1 (q) : ’ -cx  g:
Conversely, by Step 5, for all ’ 2 L1 (q) such that ’ -cx   there exists f’ng ￿ B0 such that
’n
k￿k1 ! ’ and ’n -cx ’ -cx   for all n 2 N. Hence, (33) follows.
14Moreover, [7, 4.3, 10.2, and 13.8] guarantee that, if   2 B0 and p 2 ￿￿ (q) then ￿j j￿j
dp















dq (!)￿  (!)d!
￿
: (36)
By (33) and (36), (34) follows since
R
￿dp is a continuous linear functional on L1 (q).
If (S;￿;q) is adequate, [7, 4.3, 10.2, and 13.4] guarantee that, if   2 B0 and p 2 ￿￿ (q) then
￿j j￿j
dp












dq￿  (1 ￿ !)(!)d!:
But, notice that if   is simple and L1 (q) 3 ’ ￿d  , then there exists a version of ’ which is simple
too, thus proving (35). ￿
Step 7. If either I preserves second order stochastic dominance or if (S;￿;q) is adequate and I is
rearrangement invariant, then, for all (t;p) 2 R￿￿￿ (q),
G(t;p) = sup
￿
I ( ) :
Z








dq (!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d! < t
￿
: (37)
Proof. Observe that the set
￿
  2 B0 :
R
 dp ￿ t
￿
is the closure of
￿
  2 B0 :
R
 dp < t
￿
. The fact
that I is continuous implies the ￿rst equality. In what follows ’;  2 B0. If I preserves second order
stochastic dominance, then I is Schur concave. For, if ’ %cx   then ￿’ %cx ￿  and ￿’ %icx ￿ .
























I ( ) :
Z




I ( ) : inf
￿Z






I ( ) :
Z




I ( ) : inf
￿Z





By Step 6, (37) follows. ￿
Step 8. (i) implies (ii) and (25), also (iv) implies (ii) and (25) provided (S;￿;q) is adequate.












(1 ￿ !)d! for all   2 B0 and for all p 2 ￿￿ (q).
Hence, (37) implies (25). By Step 2.b and (37), it descends the following chain of implications









(!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d! for all   2 B0
=)
￿













(!)￿  (1 ￿ !)d! < t
￿
8t 2 R
=) G(t;p) ￿ G(t;p0) 8t 2 R:
15Hence, G(t;￿) is Shur convex for all t 2 R. ￿
Step 9. (i) implies (iii), (iii) implies (iv), and (ii) implies (v).
Proof. The step is proved by a routine argument. ￿
Finally, Steps 4 and 8 guarantee that (i),(ii). In this case (24) and (25) hold. Moreover, if
(S;￿;q) is adequate, the same steps and Step 9 deliver both (v))(i))(iii))(iv))(ii))(v). ￿
Before proving Theorem 2, we prove two ancillary results.
Lemma 1 Let (u;G) be an uncertainty averse representation for %. If % is probabilistically sophis-
ticated wrt q 2 ￿￿, then domG ￿ R ￿ ￿￿ (q).
Proof. By de￿nition, domG ￿ R￿￿￿. Next, we show that G(t;p) = 1 for all (t;p) 2 R￿￿￿n￿￿ (q).
Fix t 2 R and p 2 ￿￿n￿￿ (q). It follows that there exists A 2 ￿ such that p(A) > 0 and q (A) = 0.
Since u(X) = R, there exist fxng;fyng ￿ X such that u(xn) =
p
n and u(yn) = ￿n. De￿ne
fn = ynAxn for all n 2 N. By probabilistic sophistication, it follows that fn ￿ xn for all n 2 N.
Hence, u(xfn) = u(xn) =
p
n for all n 2 N. But, for each n 2 N
Z
u(fn)dp = ￿np(A) +
p
np(Ac) ! ￿1 as n ! 1:
It follows that eventually fn 2
￿













conclude that G(t;p) = 1. ￿
Lemma 2 Let (u;G) be an uncertainty averse representation for % and let I be de￿ned as in (23).
The following statements are true wrt q 2 ￿￿.
(a) % is probabilistically sophisticated if and only if I is rearrangement invariant on B0;
(b) % satis￿es ￿rst order stochastic dominance if and only if I preserves ￿rst order stochastic dom-
inance on B0;
(c) % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance if and only if I preserves second order stochastic
dominance on B0.
Proof. First notice that B0 = fu(f) : f 2 Fg. By de￿nition,
V (f) = I (u(f)) 8f 2 F
represents %.
(a) ￿Only if.￿Consider ’;  2 B0 such that ’ ￿d  , then
q (fs 2 S : ’(s) = tg) = q (fs 2 S :   (s) = tg) 8t 2 R:
Since u(X) = R, for each t 2 R choose xt 2 X such that u(xt) = t. Since ’ and   are simple, it
follows that ’(S) = ft1;:::;tng and   (S) = ft0
1;:::;t0
n0g. De￿ne
Ai = fs 2 S : ’(s) = tig and Bj =
n





Finally, de￿ne f and g such that f (s) = xti if s 2 Ai and g (s) = xt0
j if s 2 Bj. It follows that ’ = u(f),

























if x = 2 fxtgt2R.
16￿If.￿ Suppose that f and g satisfy (9). De￿ne ’ = u ￿ f and   = u ￿ g. Since ’ and   are
simple, it is immediate to see that ’ ￿d  . Then, since I is rearrangement invariant, it follows that
I (u(f)) = I (’) = I ( ) = I (u(g)), which implies that f ￿ g.
(b) ￿Only if.￿ Consider ’;  2 B0 such that q (fs 2 S : ’(s) ￿ tg) ￿ q (fs 2 S :   (s) ￿ tg) for
each t 2 R. De￿ne f;g 2 F to be such that ’ = u(f) and   = u(g). It follows that
q (fs 2 S : f (s) - xg) = q (fs 2 S : u(f (s)) ￿ u(x)g) = q (fs 2 S : ’(s) ￿ u(x)g)
￿ q (fs 2 S :   (s) ￿ u(x)g) = q (fs 2 S : u(g (s)) ￿ u(x)g)
= q (fs 2 S : g (s) - xg) 8x 2 X:
Therefore, it is clear that f and g satisfy (10). It follows that f % g, and so I (’) = I (u(f)) ￿
I (u(g)) = I ( ).
￿If.￿Suppose that f and g satisfy (10). De￿ne ’ = u ￿ f and   = u ￿ g. It follows that
q (fs 2 S : ’(s) ￿ tg) = q (fs 2 S : u(f (s)) ￿ u(xt)g) = q (fs 2 S : f (s) - xtg)
￿ q (fs 2 S : g (s) - xtg) = q (fs 2 S : u(g (s)) ￿ u(xt)g)
= q (fs 2 S :   (s) ￿ tg) 8t 2 R:
It follows that ’ %fsd  . Then, since I preserves ￿rst order stochastic dominance, it follows that
I (u(f)) = I (’) ￿ I ( ) = I (u(g)), which implies f % g.
The proof of (c) is analogous. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the uncertainty averse representation (u;G) for %. Then, de￿ne the
functional I : B0 ! R as in (23).
(i) implies (ii). Since % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance (wrt q), it is probabilistically
sophisticated. By Lemma 1, domG ￿ R ￿ ￿￿ (q). By Lemma 2, I preserves second order stochastic
dominance. Hence, Theorem 3 guarantees that (ii) holds.
(ii) implies (i). Since domG ￿ R ￿ ￿￿ (q), by Theorem 3 I preserves second order stochastic
dominance. By Lemma 2, % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance.
Furthermore, assume (i) or (ii) hold. By Theorem 3, I satis￿es (24) and (25). Hence, (14) and




= u(xf) for each f 2 F.
Assume that (S;￿;q) is adequate.
(i) implies (iii) and (iii) implies (iv). The statement is proved by a routine argument.
(iv) implies (v). Since % is probabilistically sophisticated, by Lemma 1, domG ￿ R￿￿￿ (q), and
by Lemma 2, I is rearrangement invariant. By Theorem 3, (v) holds.
By Theorem 3, (v) implies (ii), which concludes the proof. ￿
A.3 Proofs of Corollary 1, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3
Let I : B0 ! R be de￿ned as in (23). For each ’ 2 B0 the normalized Greenberg-Pierskalla superdif-
ferential of I at ’ is the set
@I (’) =
￿




 dp ) I (’) ￿ I ( )
￿
:
17Proposition 4 Let (u;G) be an uncertainty averse representation for %. The following conditions
are equivalent for ￿ p 2 ￿:
(i) % is more uncertainty averse than %u;￿ p;
(ii) G(t; ￿ p) = minp2￿ G(t;p) for all t 2 R;




Proof. (i) implies (ii). Since %u;￿ p is a SEU preference, setting
￿ G(t;p) =
(
t if (t;p) = (t; ￿ p)
1 otherwise
(38)




is an uncertainty averse representation of %u;￿ p.
By [2, Proposition 6], the fact that % is more uncertainty averse that %u;￿ p translates into
t ￿ G(t;p) ￿ ￿ G(t;p) 8(t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿: (39)
Substituting p = ￿ p in (39) delivers
G(t; ￿ p) = t = min
p2￿
G(t;p) 8t 2 R
where the last equality follows from G 2 L(R ￿ ￿).















I ( ) :
Z
 dp ￿ t
￿
(40)
for all (t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿. Let   2 B0 be such that
R
 d￿ p ￿ t, then, by (40), I ( ) ￿ G(t; ￿ p). But (ii)




td￿ p then I ( ) ￿ I (t) and
we conclude that ￿ p 2 @I (t).
(iii) implies (i). Let f 2 F and x 2 X. Since ￿ p 2
\
t2R




u(x)d￿ p ) I (u(f)) ￿ I (u(x))
that is
x %u;￿ p f ) x %u;￿ p f:
But the latter condition can be easily seen to be equivalent to % being more uncertainty averse that
%u;￿ p.13 ￿
13Indeed, consider two preorders %1 and %2 on F. Assume that %i over X is represented by an a¢ ne nonconstant
function ui and for each f 2 F there exists xi
f ￿i f (i = 1;2). Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) For each f 2 F and each x 2 X, f %1 x ) f %2 x;
(ii) %1 coincides with %2 on X and x2
f %1 x1
f for all f 2 F;
(iii) For each f 2 F and each x 2 X, f ￿1 x ) f ￿2 x (i.e. x %2 f ) x %1 f).





















for all convex functions ‘ : R ! R. This implies that p %cx q for all p 2 ￿￿ (q). By Theorem 2,
G(t;￿) is Shur convex for all t 2 R. Therefore, for each t 2 R, G(t;p) ￿ G(t;q) if p 2 ￿￿ (q) and
G(t;p) = 1 if p 62 ￿￿ (q). That is, q 2 argminG(t;￿) for all t 2 R. By Proposition 4, the statement
follows.
Assume (ii). By Theorem 2, (i) is satis￿ed and the statement follows. ￿
Let u : X ! R be a nonconstant a¢ ne function and C a subset of ￿. Set




u(g)dp 8p 2 C: (41)
Notice that %￿ is complete (and represented by u) on X, hence the de￿nition of nontrivial unambiguous
event can be naturally extended to this more general setting.14 Next we prove that the equivalence
among points (i)-(iii) of Proposition 2 holds more in general for any relation %￿ de￿ned as above (the
special case is obtained by setting C = dom￿ G and observing that % and %￿ coincide on X).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) implies (iii). By assumption, there exist x;y;z 2 X such that x ￿￿
z ￿￿ y and xAy ￿￿ z. Wlog u(x) = 1 and u(y) = 0. Then x ￿￿ z ￿￿ y amounts to u(z) 2 (0;1) and
xAy ￿￿ z amounts to
R
u(xAy)dp = u(z) for all p 2 C, that is p(A) = u(z) for all p 2 C.
(iii) implies (ii). Consider x;y 2 X such that x ￿￿ y. Wlog u(x) = 1 and u(y) = 0. By
(iii), it follows that there exists ￿ 2 (0;1) such that
R
u(xAy)dp = p(A) = ￿ for all p 2 C. Set
z = ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)y and conclude x ￿￿ z ￿￿ y and xAy ￿￿ z.
(iii) implies (ii). Follows from the fact that %￿ is nontrivial on X. ￿
A subset C of ￿￿ (q) is Shur convex (wrt q 2 ￿￿) if and only if fp 2 ￿￿ (q) : p -cx p0g ￿ C for
each p0 2 C.
Proposition 5 Let q 2 ￿￿ and %￿ be de￿ned as in (41). If A is a nontrivial unambiguous event for
%￿ and C is Schur convex (wrt q), then C = fqg.


















￿1A (!)￿ d￿ p
dq (1 ￿ !)d!:
Since q 2 fp 2 ￿￿ (q) : p -cx ￿ pg ￿ C and A is a nontrivial unambiguous event, then
￿R
1Adp : ￿￿ (q) 3 p -cx ￿ p
￿
=
fq (A)g = f￿g, hence,
Z 1
0




￿1A (!)￿ d￿ p




1 ! 2 (0;￿)
0 ! 2 [￿;1):








dq (1 ￿ !)d! (42)
but ￿ d￿ p
dq : (0;1) ! [0;1) is decreasing and
R 1
0 ￿ d￿ p
dq (!)d! = 1 [7, 4.3]. Therefore, by standard argu-
ments, (42) implies ￿ d￿ p
dq = 1 (￿-a.e.). It follows that
d￿ p
dq = 1 (q-a.e.) [7, 2.8], and ￿ p = q. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Let A be a nontrivial unambiguous event for %.
(i) Su¢ ciency is immediate. As to necessity, notice that %￿ is represented by (18) and dom￿ G
is Shur convex subset of ￿￿ (q). Proposition 5 delivers dom￿ G = fqg. By de￿nition of dom￿ G and
since G 2 L(R ￿ ￿), it follows that for each (t;p) 2 R ￿ ￿
G(t;p) =
(
t if (t;p) = (t;q)
1 otherwise.
The statement follows.
(ii) Assume that (S;￿;q) is adequate. Su¢ ciency is trivial. As for necessity, notice that, by
Theorem 2, % satis￿es second order stochastic dominance and the statement follows. ￿
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